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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

NANCY SCHNEIDER LOGAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,;
vs.

Case No. 16557

EDWARD JAMES SCHNEIDER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is on appeal by the Defendant-Appellant from
an Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for
Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Harlan Burns
presiding, denying Defendant-Appellant's Motion To Stay
Entry Of Judgment granting full faith and credit to a Judgment of the State of Ohio.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff-Respondent commenced this action in the lower
Court to enforce in the State of Utah a Judgment originally
granted in the State of Ohio.

Plaintiff-Respondent filed a

Motion For Summary Judgment which was granted.

Defendant-

Appellant thereafter filed a Motion To Stay the Entry of
Judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and also requested that the lower Court hear oral argument
with respect to Plaintiff-Respondent's Motion For Summary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-1- OCR, may contain errors.
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Judgment.

Said Motion To Stay the Entry of Judgment was

orally argued to the lower Court.

The lower Court denied

Defendant-Appellant's Motion, prompting this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have this Honorable Supreme
Court affirm the order of the lower Court denying DefendantAppellant's Motion To Stay The Entry Of Judgment and, further to affirm the Judgment of the lower Court giving full
faith and credit to the Judgment of the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent agrees with Defendant-Appellant's
Statement of Facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF OHIO HAD JURISDIC-

TION OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AT ALL STATES OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Throughout this Brief references will be made to various
Exhibits.

All said Exhibits are attached to the Memorandum

In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment on file herein.
The Ohio Courts obtained jurisdiction over the person
of Defendant-Appellant for the original 1961 court action to
obtain child support by personal service
Appellant.

upon the Defendant-

Exhibit 4 shows the Motion for child support,

duly signed by Plaintiff-Respondent and Exhibit 5 shows personal service of said Motion upon Defendant-Appellant.

Exhibit

6 is the order of the Ohio Courts granting the original child
support order for 1961.
-2-
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Of particular significance in Exhibit 6 is the last
paragraph which provides:
All matters with reference to the custody
of said minor child, the support and visitation of said minor child, shall be subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of this court.
(emphasis added)
In 1967 Plaintiff-Respondent, through her attorney,
filed a Motion to reduce unpaid child support to Judgment.
See Exhibit 7 for said copy of said Motion.

Said Motion

was personally served upon Defendant-Appellant by the Sheriff's Office of Orange County, California, thereby giving
Defendant-Appellant notice of the action.
for Sheriff's Return of Service.

See Exhibit 8

(The adequacy of the

notice is addressed in Point II, infra.)

From the above,

it can be seen that the Ohio Court had continuing jurisdiction over Defendant-Appellant for its action in 1967.
Defendant-Appellant, at page 9 of his Brief, states
that Exhibit 8, Sheriff's Return of Service is defective
because it does not say what document was served upon
Defendant-Appellant.

Defendant-Appellant should not now

be allowed to raise a doubt as to whether Exhibit 8 is invalid for the above reason because he failed to file any
Affidavits claiming that the document was not served upon
him at the time the Motion For Summary Judgment was ruled
upon.
In 1975, Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Motion with
the Ohio Court asking for an increase in the amount of child
~upport

and for a

Judgm~nt

on the amount of the arreage of

Sponsoredsupport.
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and Exhibit 11 for a notice of hearing of said Motion.

Def-

endant-Appellant, in response thereto, made a general appearance by filing his Declaration of Edward James Schneider,
Exhibit 12.
The Declaration Of Edward James Schneider (Exhibit
12) cures any and all defects in jurisdiction that may have
occured up to the 1975 Ohio Court action.

In Barber v.

Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah, 1974) this Court held that an
appearance by a Defendant for any purpose other than to object to jurisdiction, constitutes a general apperance.

Since

Defendant-Appellant, by his Declaration, did not object to
jurisdiction, his action constituted a general appearance.
In Coleman v.

M~,

493 P.2d 48 (Oregon,l972}, the

Oregon Supremr Court ruled that a party waives all irregularities in service of process, whether it be before or after
Judgment, when he makes a general appearance.

Since Defendant-

Appellant made a general appearance through his Declaration
he waived any irregularities in jurisdiction that may have
existed up to that time.
From the above outline of the events in this matter,
it can be seen that the Ohio Court had jurisdiction over
Defendant at each and every stage of the proceedings and that
any alleged defect in jurisdiction was cured by the general
appearance of Defendant-Appellant by his Declaration (Exhibit 12).

Therefore, this Court is urged to rule that the

Ohio Court had jurisdiction over the person of DefendantAppellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POINT II:

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD SUFFICIENT NOTICE

OF ALL PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT IN OHIO.
Defendant-Appellant contends that he did not receive
sufficient notice of the 1967 Court action whereby a Judgment was granted against him for child support arreages.
As outlined in Point I, Plaintiff-Respondent filed
a motion in 1967 to reduce delinquent child support to
Judgment.

(Exhibit 7)

Said Motion was personally served

upon the Defendant-Appellant on October 3, 1967.

(Exhibit

8). The Motion provided the following material factc to
Defendant-Appellant, namely, the amount of the weekly child
support obligation, the claimed current amount of the delinquency and a request that said amount be reduced to
Judgment.

About two months after service of the Motion upon

Defendant, on December 1, 1967, the Ohio Court entered its
Judgment.

(Exhibit 9).

Both the United States Constitution, 14th Amendment,
and the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, provide
that "no person shall be deprived of 1 ife, 1 iberty or property, without due process of law".

As applied to this

case, the due process clause requires that Defendant-Appellant be provided with sufficient notice of the Court proceedings.
The required nature of the notice, to satisfy due
process requirements, is set forth in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law,

§

562:

To meetthe requirements of due process,
the notice
be reasonable and adequate

~ust
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for the purpose, due regard being had to the
nature of the proceedings and the character
of the rights which may be affected by it.
It must give sufficient notice of the pendency
of the action or proceeding and a reasonable
opportunity to a defendant to appear and assert his rights before a tribunal legally
constituted to adjudicate such rights . . .
The fundamental test is whether the notice is
fair and just to the parties involved. The
adequacy of notice respecting proceedings
that may affect a party's rights turns, to a
considerable extent, on the knowledge which
the circumstances show such party may be assumed to have with respect to the consequences
of his own conduct. (emphasis added)
In Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64,67 (Utah, 1978),
this Court ruled that ''implied in the due process clause of
our State Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing
to determine their rights under the law".

In Watson vs.

Washington Preferred Life Insurance Co., 502 P.2d 1016 (Wash.,
1972), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the essence
of procedural due process is notice and the right to be heard,
and that the notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise
a party of the pendency of the proceedings.
From the above, the two required elements of notice
for due process requirements appear.

First, notice of the

pendency of the action and second, reasonable opportunity
to appear and assert his rights.
Defendant-Appellant was given notice of the action
by the Motion (Exhibit 7) which was served upon him.

Defen-

dant-Appellant was notified that Plaintiff-Respondent was
seeking a Judgment against him for an amount listed on the
Motion represented to be delinquent child support payments.
We can also assume that Defendant knew he was in default on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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notice of the proceedings.

Defendant was also given a rea-

sonable opportunity to appear and assert his rights because
no action was taken upon the Motion until December l, 1967,
almost two months after the Motion was served upon the
Defendant-Appellant.

Because of this delay in obtaining

the 1967 Judgment, Defendant-Appellant can hardly claim
he was not afforded an opportunity to appear in the case.
Defendant-Appellant, at page 9 of his brief, quotes
Revised Code Ohio Section 2309.67 for the proposition that
notice should have been given to Defendant-Appellant of
time, place, etc. of any court hearing.

However, this

section begins "When notice of a motion is required", thereby implying that in Ohio there may be some motions without
notice.

However, any alleged violation of the Ohio law of

notice would seem to be immaterial since the issue on appeal
is not whether the Ohio law of notice was satisfied, but
rather was due process requirements of notice satisfied.
In Transamerican Title Insurance Co. v. United Resources
~.

24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970) this Court held

that an irregularity of procedure not constituting due
process may be asserted as a defense for an action on a foreign judgment if properly raised.

That case does not allow

an alleged violation of State Law not constituting a violation
of due process to be raised as a defense.

Furthermore,

Defendant.-Appellant has waived any defect of notice based
on Ohio Statutory Law for the 1967 hearing because he made
a general appearance by his Declaration Of Edward James
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Schneider, (Exhibit 12) in 1975 and failed to object to the
notice given him in 1967.

Therefore, it is argued that

Defendant-Appellant had notice of the 1967 Court action
sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.
POINT III:

THE UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT

PROHIBIT ENFORCEMENT OF THE OHIO JUDGMENT.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-22 provides:
Within eight years: An action upon a judgment
or decree of any Court of the United States,
or of any state or territory within the United
States.
Defendant-Appellant has argued that the above statute
prohibits collection of that portion of the Judgment represented by the 1967 award.

However, Defendant-Appellant is over-

looking the fact that a judgment can be renewed, thereby
extending its life.
of Utah.

This procedure is accepted in the State

See, for example, Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d

397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965) where renewal was denied because
action for renewal was commenced 8 l/2 years after judgment
was granted.
By taking the 1975 Court action, Plaintiff-Respondent
renewed the 1967 Judgment and said Judgment was merged into
the 1975 Judgment.

That this is the effect in the State of

Ohio is apparent by reference to the Certificate of Judgment
(Exhibit 14) which certifies that Judgment was rendered on
June 13, 1975 for support arreage for $7,902.84 ($7,522.84,
the amount of the renewed 1967 Judgn1ent as of May 3, 1975
and $380.00 for arreages since 1967).

From the above it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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seems apparent that the effect of the 1975 Judgment was, in
part, to renew the 1967 Judgment, thereby extending its life.
Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated,

~

78-12-35 pro-

vi des:
If when a cause of action accrues aqainst a
person when he is out of state, the- action
may be commenced within the term herein limited after his return to the state; . . .
In Defendant-Appellant's Written Answers To Interrogatories, the Defendant-Appellant states that he became
a resident of this State on May 6, 1977 and has since been
out-of-state for approximately 4 l/2 months.
Plaintiff-Respondent's, "cause of action", namely
the right to collect upon the Judgment, accrued while Defendant-Appellant resided outside the State of Utah.

Therefore,

the above provision tolls the running of the Statute of
limitations and allows Plaintiff-Respondent to commence her
action against Defendant-Appellant "within the term herein
limited after his return to the state".

Specifically, the

eight year limitation period did not commence until such
time as

Def~njant

became a resident of the State of Utah,

in this case on May 6, 1977.
The uefendant cites Revised Code Ohio Section 2305.07
for the proposition that it establishes a six year statute
of

limitatio~s

the case.

for child

s~pport

arrearages.

This is not

ihe Ohio Courts rave held that Statutes of Limit-

ation of the State do not apply to alimony and support paymer, t s .

Q_e C1m f' _'/__-_Be a!:.i, 94 0 h i o Ap p . 3 6 7 ( 1 9 53 ) and Lem e r t

Lemert,
72 Ohio St. 364, 74 N.E. 194 (1905).
v. Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

For the above reasons, the Court is urged to rule
that the eight year Statute of Limitations period imposed by
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-22, does not prohibit enforcement of the Ohio Judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Ohio Court obtained jurisdiction over DefendantAppellant for any and all action taken by that Court.

Said

jurisdiction was obtained by personal service upon the Defendant-Appellant at every stage of the proceedings.

Defendant-

Appellant also received notice of the 1967 Court action sufficient to satisfy due process requirements.

The Defendant-

Appellant was notified of the nature of the proceedinqs and
was given sufficient time (2 months) to appear and assert
his rights.
The eight year Statute of Limitations of this State
is not applicable to this case because Plaintiff-Respondent
renewed the 1967 Judgment in 1975 and, furthermore, because
Defendant-Appellant resided outside of this State until May
6, 1977, thereby tolling the running of the Statute of Limitation until that date.
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm
the ruling of the lower Court.
Respectfully submitted this i7th day of September, 1979.
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